utorok 16. februára 2010

The Five Stages of Collapse by Dmitry Orlov

I first saw Dmitri's posts in the aftermath of Lehman Bothers collapse in late 2008. Now I think it is actual again so I'm posting it here too. Problems in Greece are now in stage four.

....

Elizabeth Kübler-Ross defined the five stages of coming to terms with grief and tragedy as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance, and applied it quite successfully to various forms of catastrophic personal loss, such as death of a loved one, sudden end to one's career, and so forth. Several thinkers, notably James Howard Kunstler and, more recently John Michael Greer, have pointed out that the Kübler-Ross model is also quite terrifyingly accurate in reflecting the process by which society as a whole (or at least the informed and thinking parts of it) is reconciling itself to the inevitability of a discontinuous future, with our institutions and life support systems undermined by a combination of resource depletion, catastrophic climate change, and political impotence. But so far, little has been said specifically about the finer structure of these discontinuities. Instead, there is to be found a continuum of subjective judgments, ranging from "a severe and prolonged recession" (the prediction we most often read in the financial press), to Kunstler's "Long Emergency," to the ever-popular "Collapse of Western Civilization," painted with an ever-wider brush-stroke...


Stages of Collapse

Stage 1: Financial collapse. Faith in "business as usual" is lost. The future is no longer assumed resemble the past in any way that allows risk to be assessed and financial assets to be guaranteed. Financial institutions become insolvent; savings are wiped out, and access to capital is lost.

Stage 2: Commercial collapse. Faith that "the market shall provide" is lost. Money is devalued and/or becomes scarce, commodities are hoarded, import and retail chains break down, and widespread shortages of survival necessities become the norm.

Stage 3: Political collapse. Faith that "the government will take care of you" is lost. As official attempts to mitigate widespread loss of access to commercial sources of survival necessities fail to make a difference, the political establishment loses legitimacy and relevance.

Stage 4: Social collapse. Faith that "your people will take care of you" is lost, as local social institutions, be they charities or other groups that rush in to fill the power vacuum run out of resources or fail through internal conflict.

Stage 5: Cultural collapse. Faith in the goodness of humanity is lost. People lose their capacity for "kindness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality, compassion, charity" (Turnbull, The Mountain People). Families disband and compete as individuals for scarce resources. The new motto becomes "May you die today so that I die tomorrow" (Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago). There may even be some cannibalism.

You can find his presentation here and here and original post on his blog.

'Unofficial' note on Greece

FT Alphaville posted last Friday very interesting opinion about situation in Greece. Some say it is from Goldman, other say its from a major UK bank. Anyway, I enjoyed reading it.


GGBs: Our debt, your problem.

If Greece defaults, it will be the biggest sovereign default in history. If Greece is bailed out, it will be the biggest sovereign bailout in history. That’s what you get when there’s EUR 250 billion at stake. The Russian and Argentinean defaults, both south of EUR 60 billion, were not even a quarter as big. Thing is, as a Greek I’m as worried about the whole thing as a resident of the fictitious “South Sea” would have been when the South Sea bubble went bust. Here’s why: Debt is not dealt with very well by economic theory. Debts net out. For every lender there is necessarily a borrower.

Total wealth is the dollar amount it takes to control every home, every corporation every consumer durable and every privately owned resource. No mention of debt here (though if you want to get difficult, you will point out that to control a corporate you need to own both its stock and its debt, but bear with me) Thing is, if you add a bit of debt, you untie a lot of agents’ hands. If a 35 year old heart surgeon has access to the mortgage market he can move into a beautiful house before he collects his first ever paycheck, and he’s definitely good for the money.

That pushes up home prices. So a bit of debt definitely pushes up total wealth. On the other hand, recent experience indicates that a whole lot of debt leads to breakdowns. If we’ve all borrowed money to buy assets and for some reason they take a break from going up, marginal borrowers who count on selling appreciating assets to service interest on their debt will miss their payments. Their liquidator will sell their assets. This will drive down asset prices, which in turn will trigger margin calls to more people and the vicious cycle can start that Irving Fischer dubbed debt deflation. 2008 looked a lot like that and most people believe it had a lot to do with overindebtedness.

We also need to look at savings. If a country has a lot of savings, it can support a lot of debt. Japan has massive government debt, but equally massive private savings. Some countries, like China have massive savings and have to look abroad for investments. And some, like the US are the other way round. When it comes to debt, Greece is in a uniquely privileged situation. No, seriously! For starters, we Greeks are some of the world’s richest people.

On the official statistics alone, we are comfortably in the world’s top 40 for per capita GDP. But that’s peanuts. Lest we forget, that’s our declared income. Don’t quote me on this apocryphal statistic, but I’m reliably informed that exactly six Greeks declared more than a million EUR in income last time anybody counted. And exactly 85 declared more than half a million. So we’re probably a bit better than top 40.

Either that, or this trading floor alone has more rich people than Greece. Hell, our new recruits for this season alone could probably do it. If you have any doubts about Greek wealth, check out on Bloomberg the balance sheet of the National Bank of Greece, Eurobank, Alphabank and Piraeus bank, the top four. The four of them alone command EUR 164 billion in deposits! Slightly misleading, since they all have operations in the Balkans, but that’s almost one GDP, lying in deposits!!! More to the point, how many Greeks do you know who keep their money in Greece? That’s merely our spending money, it’s a small fraction of our savings and assets. Don’t even mention that a square meter costs less in Belgravia than in Psychico, Philothei or Kifissia.

Bottom line, as long as Switzerland and Citibank are going concerns (for that is where we keep the bulk of our savings), we’re loaded. Second, Greece scores well across all measures of debt but one:

We have extremely low household debt / GDP ratio.
We have extremely low corporate debt/ GDP ratio.
We have extremely low bank debt/ GDP ratio.
We have a manageable total debt / GDP ratio. Half that of the UK or the US!
We only score poorly on sovereign debt / GDP ratio.
That’s it!

Greece is a country with rich, underlevereaged savers, underleveraged corporates and a healthy banking system whose government happens to have borrowed a hell of a lot of money. But the world has grounds to be scared: with rates at 5% and government debt comfortably above 100% of GDP, servicing that debt costs 6% of GDP at the moment. GDP growth, in the meantime has not touched 6% nominal in a long, long time.

So here’s the deal: No matter what happens, the debt is now at a level where its growth has reached escape velocity. Even if Greece were to run zero deficit, ultimately we are heading to default. We can default now or we can default later. Is that a big deal? Frankly, no. 75% of the debt, probably more, is held externally. If JGBs fail to pay coupon, that’s a disaster for Japan, since 95% are held domestically. If GGBs fail to pay coupon, it’s far less catastrophic. For the debt-deflation spiral to start, you need the debt to be internal.

With an alleged 216 billion held by foreigners (plus the recent 8) the contagion risks mainly lie outside the border! Even the banks who are in the news for holding all those ECB-funded GGB’s aren’t as long as US banks are long Treasuries, for example, though they would probably have to be restructured. Basically, the economy is paying 5% or even 6% of GDP to service a debt whose failure will hurt three or four times more abroad than it will in Greece. Do I look worried?

Supposing we default, what will be left is a AAA credit here. Give it five years and a line will form to our door to lend us more. It would not be fantastic for us to default, granted, because at the moment we are in a virtual reality where a bunch of greedy foreigners lend us a fresh 5% of GDP every year on top of what they were lending us the year before. If we default they won’t lend us again for a short while. During that period we will have to live within our means. That will be a haircut. But it won’t be a catastrophe for Greece. Germany took a bigger GDP hit than that last year, for example, and so did the UK!

Indeed, I’m willing to bet Greeks continue to have good access to the international financial markets, and here’s why: as I’m writing this, Greek shipowners owe some EUR 100 billion to the international banking system.

Even with the Baltic Dry somewhere in the dungeon, this debt is being honored and serviced. Greek companies will be just fine, basically. It’s the government that is the joke here, not the country! Nevertheless, a sovereign default by Greece will set off a cascade. Italy has tons more debt than Greece and a much bigger proportion of it is held in Italy.

That won’t be a picnic. It gets worse than that, of course. People like to talk about PIGS, but the real oink oinks of the past decade have resided in the protestant part of the world. The United Kingdom and the US have total debt of more than 400% of GDP. You can never grow your way out of 400%, it’s as simple as that. And this concludes my first point: be careful what you wish for here, because Greece is a rich country that will mainly hurt others if it defaults. Directly (through the default) and indirectly, via contagion.

A default will have both negatives for Greeks (less money to spend) and positives, which don’t concern anybody here, so I will discuss them separately at the end of this piece.

This brings me to my second big idea here. When the Paulson / Bernanke / Geithner triumvirate decided to save the banks in September of 2008, who exactly was saved? Was it the American economy, as we are led to believe? What was the alternative? The establishment would have us believe that there was no alternative.

It was “hold your nose and save Wall Street” or a return to the dark ages. As Joseph Stiglitz, Willem Buiter and Paul Krugman were at pains to point out back then, an alternative existed: we could have done a GM/Chrysler on the banks. Expropriate the equity holders, pay 15 cents on the dollar to the bondholders and nationalize. Had we gone down that route, there would have been different winners and losers. Small business would have been a massive winner.

Rather than create zombie banks that are too busy pretending Ford is a great company (Ford owes banks 24 billion) and commercial real estate is about to turn a corner, they would carry on extending credit to small business. Sticking money into the zombies has had 100% the opposite effect of what was advertised. It has caused “extend and pretend” to the borrowers who are too big to fail and has throttled the little guy. Business was a loser.

The newspapers have us think that bankers were the winners. We did not do too poorly, but we are not the big winners. The big winners here are the baby boomers. That’s because they have their name against some 80% of the value in all pension funds and insurance policies.

And if the banks had gone down, that’s who holds their debt and much of their equity. Bottom line, had the banks gone down, no insurance product would be worth a penny more than the paper it’s printed on. So basically, the 2008 bailout sacrificed business, i.e. our generation, but saved our parents. The US bailout was intergenerational transfer, pure and simple. Now, our parents did not have enough kids.

The past 10 years has been the story of their struggle to sell us their homes and their equities at the price that will allow them to retire conveniently as they turn 65. They’ve thrown low interest rates at us to induce us to borrow against the homes they are selling us, but that backfired because low rates have pushed down their bond returns and their dividends. And their stocks have not gone up in ten years. The final straw was going to be the decimation of their insurance contracts and pension plans, but Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner jumped in and saved them.

Talk about the bankers is fashionable, but in the bigger scheme of things it was a side-show. It’s pretty much the same with the Greek situation. Yes, we Greeks have been naughty. Yes, we are overindebted. Yes, we live above our means. But, much like the evil bankers, this has nothing whatsoever to do with Greece. That is my main thesis here. The Greek saga (for I refuse to see it as a tragedy) is all about saving the French and German baby boomers’ retirement.

Sleepy fund managers and insurers in the north of Europe decided that they did not want currency risk and they did not much fancy credit risk. Sovereign risk denominated in EUR was just the ticket for them to deliver on their promises. So the decision was made to lend money to the Greek government. Tons of money. Leaving out wars, more than any country has ever paid back that escaped default. Greece had no need for this money and indeed put it to horrible use. But Greece is not the protagonist here.

This is a domestic issue for France and Germany! The governments of France and Germany have a choice here. They can side with the baby boomer generation, tax its progeny and funnel the money to Greece. Or they can refuse and have the baby boomers reap what they’ve sown. But the bottom line here is that if the money had not come to Greece it would have gone to Italy, Spain or Portugal. It wouldn’t have gone to Bunds and OATs, because they did not yield enough for these wide fund managers’ taste.

The goings on in America, where nobody is thankful for having been “saved” and where the economy is suffering the result of a misguided, short-term decision may push the French and German government to say “the Greeks don’t deserve a bailout” and allow their insurance behemoths to take the hit. But I would not bet on it. My money is that the baby boomers prevail again! Make sure you’ve covered GGB shorts by the end of the week!!! I, for one, hope we’re allowed to default, and here’s why: Once upon a time, Greece was a model small democracy. An extremely frugal government ran tight budgets and provided an extremely basic safety net, and truly threadbare services for a very low cost: Tax collected was minimal.

While tax rates may have been high, collection was virtually nil. A small oligarchy was the only source of capital and had the acumen, education and experience to deploy it as the country developed. Old families controlled the steel, cement, foodstuffs and construction companies that rebuilt Greece after the war. As recently as 1980, debt/GDP was at 30% and it would have been much lower were it not for the high costs of defense. When Greece joined the EU in 1980, all that changed. It was party time. Money that was sent to build the Greek infrastructure was funneled pretty much directly into the pockets of the oligarchy as well as the new Socialist oligarchy that emerged.

This was not chump change. It was 6% of GDP for 30 years. With the exception of farmers, who did extremely well off of the Common Agricultural Policy, the rest of the money went pretty much straight to Swiss bank accounts. As an example, Greece has paid 250% over list for F16’s and Mirage fighters and has spent EUR 750 million for an airport that was built by the same company that originally bid EUR 220 million for the project. No prizes for guessing what happened there. Once the addiction to easy money set in, the government of Greece was transformed from a lean provider of defense, basic health, basic education, a basic road network and extremely basic pensions to an auctioneer of projects to the oligarchy.

The families who control business in Greece used a system of bribes the government was happy to accept and set up a newspaper each to deliver threats its members would rather not. Sticks and carrots, and lots of Euros. And once the system was established, there was no need to stick to the money that was coming from the EU. ERM entry cost our politicians the printing press, but thanks to low EUR rates, the government could now service previously unthinkable amounts of debt with impunity. A residual part of that money may have ended up in useful projects, but the bulk ended up in the pockets of the twenty families who run Greek business.

A big chunk of that money, in turn, has been invested by these families in bringing to Greece every foreign franchise from Starbucks and Pizza Hut to IKEA and Stanley Kaplan, driving existing companies out of business in the process. In summary, EU funds have done to Greece what oil did to Nigeria, while low EUR rates have allowed the government of Greece to be able to service a debt of 100% of GDP, most of which has gone straight to the pockets of the oligarchy. Man on the street, with the exception of the farmers, has not benefited one jot. This does not make all Greeks poor. Shipowners do very well, and a natural resource called the sun is very helpful to our 165,000 hoteliers. Man on the street never saw the benefit of the 250 billion the government has borrowed. Ergo, support for austerity now that the bill has come is zero. You won’t see anybody accept an Irish solution in Greece.

The notion that Brussels will dictate to Greece terms on public sector wages and impose a May deadline are, frankly, comical. The government may like the idea, but the entire population will probably go on strike. Needless to say, Greece can pay. If the government chooses to freeze savings accounts it can pay the whole kahuna in one go. But the Greek people will refuse to take any hardship. This is a matter between some French and German baby-boomers, their government, and twenty Greek families who will happily take more. I hope we default and the country is freed from the curse of free money that befell it in 1980. Once our politicians have no more money to disburse to the oligarchs, we can start to be proud Europeans.

Albert Edwards: At 500% Net Liabilities To GDP, It Is Too Late To Prevent The Collapse Of The G-7; Greece Is Irrelevant, We Are All Now Insolvent

Albert Edwards: At 500% Net Liabilities To GDP, It Is Too Late To Prevent The Collapse Of The G-7; Greece Is Irrelevant, We Are All Now Insolvent: "

For Greece, with on and off balance sheet liabilities at over 800%, it's game over. For the Eurozone, with the same ratio at about 500%, it is also game over. For the US, at 500%+, it is, you guessed it (sorry Joseph Stiglitz), game over, but since we have the printers, it will simply take a little longer. Following up on yesterday's popular post on prevailing delusions as captured by Albert Edwards' colleague Dylan Grice, we present Albert's latest outlook. Please don't read this if you want to keep believing there is any hope left for the (developed) world.

But first some aeral photography from Dylan Grice, indicating just how far the US government is willing to go to get the population stoked about owning fixed (shouldn't it be called broken really?) income. With British QE over, and the country still to implement the same criminal annuitizing of 401(k)s that Uncle Sam is contempltating in order to make 'Buy Bonds' a 'voluntary' option one can't really decline, maybe letters on modern architecture building blocks is all that would works. As Edwards says: 'I'm not sure leaving man-sized building blocks around the City of London is really going to make an awful lot of difference, but I suppose when your public sector deficit is around 13% of GDP, every little bit helps!'

So back to Greece, the Eurozone, and policy response in general, Edwards places the causes (and 'solutions') of the escalating problem precisely where it belongs: at the core of the Keynesian systemic outlook flaw.

A major divergence of views in the market at the moment concerns what governments should be doing with their outsized fiscal deficits. Economists seem to be polarised between those who think governments should be rapidly cutting fiscal deficits to avoid impending insolvency and/or a surge in bond yields, and those who believe this will be totally counterproductive and that deficits should stay very large. Behind this controversy probably lies the key to the economic outlook.

To Edwards, and to ever more hedge fund investors judging by the jump back in Greece Bund spreads which just broke the most recent technical resistance level of 300 bps, Greece is nothing more than Russia and LTCM (or Bear Stearns as the case may be).

The situation in Greece following hard on the heels of similar solvency issues in Dubai feels to me very much like the Russian default and LTCM blow-up in 1998. For the blow-ups that year were a direct follow-on from the Asian crisis a year earlier a different chapter in the same book. There will be more crises to follow Greece, both inside and outside of the eurozone.

The outcome of broken Keynesian policy (by definition) will be ugly, and will destroy the eurozone. We said it some time ago, and SocGen has now also confirmed this bearish perspective.

My own view of developments, for what it is worth, is that any 'help' given to Greece merely delays the inevitable break-up of the eurozone. But, for me, the problem is not the size of the government deficit and the solvency or otherwise of the governments in the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain - we deliberately exclude Italy).

The problem for the PIGS is that years of inappropriately low interest rates resulted in overheating and rapid inflation, even though interest rates might well have been appropriate for the eurozone as a whole. Rapid inflation has led to overvalued bilateral real exchange rates (they do still notionally exist) for the PIGS and in most cases yawning double-digit current account deficits. With most trade done with other eurozone countries, the root problem for the PIGS is lack of competitiveness within the eurozone – an inevitable consequence of the one size fits all interest rate policy. Even if the PIGS governments could slash their fiscal deficits, as Ireland is attempting, to maintain credibility with the markets in the short term, the lack of competitiveness within the eurozone needs years of relative (and probably given the outlook elsewhere, absolute) deflation. Hence the PIGS public sector deficit will inevitably remain large as a direct consequence of this weak growth outlook.

As noted earlier on Zero Hedge, in Europe the population is a little less brainwashed by the moronic happenings on prime time TV, so while in America the destruction of the economic system, as trillions are transferred to the kleptocracy which knows fully well the end game is nigh, results in some sighs of desperation at best, in Europe the outcome will be somewhat more violent.

In my opinion this will not be tolerated by the electorates in these countries. Unlike Japan or the US, Europe has an unfortunate tendency towards civil unrest when subjected to extreme economic pain. Consigning the PIGS to a prolonged period of deflation is most likely to impose too severe a test on these nations. And the political 'consensus' within the PIGS to remain in the eurozone could falter in the face of another of Europe's unfortunate tendencies -the emergence of small extreme parties to take advantage of any unrest. My own view is that there is little 'help' that can be offered by the other eurozone nations other than temporary confidence-giving 'sticking plasters' before the ultimate denouement: the break-up of the eurozone.

And in case you were wondering why all European leaders are powerless to provide a bailout proposal that actually has a snowball's chance in hell of doing something/anything to help Greece, read on. Alternatively, if you want to find out why any plan suggested on Monday will be thoroughly useless and once digested by the market will cause another major crash, read on as well.

The pressure to tighten fiscal policy from current nose-bleed levels of deficits is not just an issue for crisis hit Greece. It is an issue for virtually all economies. It is a particular issue for the US and UK with structural (cyclically adjusted) general government deficits of almost 10% of GDP (according to the OECD)! There is a ferocious debate ongoing between those who believe there needs to be a rapid reduction in these deficits to avoid some combination of insolvency/default/rapid inflation and those who believe that there should be even more fiscal stimulus. The debate is loud and opinions are tending to be polarised.

My own view on this is that obviously we should never have got into this wholly avoidable mess in the first place. But having got here, there really is no way out that does not trigger a major market-moving upheaval. Ultimately economic prosperity over the past decade has been a sham: a totally unsustainable Ponzi scheme built on a mountain of private sector debt.GDP has simply been brought forward from the future and now it's payback time. The trouble is that, as the private sector debt unwinds, there is no political appetite to allow GDP to decline to its 'correct' level as this would involve a depression. So burgeoning public sector deficits and Quantitative Easing are required to maintain the fig-leaf of continued prosperity.

And here is the topic that will dominate over all pundit round table discussions in the next weeks: the entire world is insolvent, although some are more insolvent than others. Greek total net liabilities (on and off balance sheet) to GDP are 800%! EU: at 470%, the US, at over 500%. There is no way out but default.

Edwards' poignant summation.

I am persuaded by my colleague Dylan Grice's analysis that, including unfunded liabilities, most governments are already insolvent with debt to GDP ratios closer to 500% of GDP instead of around 100% for most G7 countries . It is too late.

Nor were Dylan and I persuaded by recent comments from Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz that it is absurd to suggest that the US and UK governments might default on their debts as they could just print money. Indeed. But a client pointed out to us that Weimar Germany did not default on its debts during its hyper-inflation. How reassuring!

I am persuaded though by Richard Koo's book about the lessons from Japan's balance sheet recession. The crux of his analysis is that governments have no option but to stimulate aggressively all the while the private sector is de-leveraging. ANY attempt at fiscal cuts simply results in renewed recession and a further loss of confidence, thus making it even harder and more costly to sustain any subsequent recovery - and hence the budget deficit ends up bigger than before (e.g. see chart below). This is exactly the outcome I expect.

The take home is very, very simple: we can delude ourselves that the game can be won (it can't), or we can prepare for the imminent collapse when delusion finally fails.

"

Greece is only a symptom

The Pragmatic Capitalist: "

From Comstock Partners:

The Greek fiscal crisis is just a symptom of world-wide credit problems that was signaled by the emergence of subprime loan disclosures as early as August 2006. The importance of subprime lending was not recognized until much later, but nevertheless evolved into a continuing series of economic and financial crises that continue until this day. The problem has now extended to sovereign debt, and, as usual, the weakest links are exposed first (Dubai and Greece) only to spread to stronger entities later. Not far behind are Portugal and Spain, then perhaps Italy and Britain. It’s not just a localized minor problem to be solved by some sleight-of-hand by the EU, but a debt crisis that could envelop the globe.

In addition to excessive fiscal deficits by some of its weaker members, the EU has some special problems for which there are no good options. The Greek government can either undertake severe fiscal austerity measures, default, be bailed out by the EU or leave the organization entirely. Each of these has unwanted consequences. The result of enough fiscal austerity to relieve the debt pressures is a severe recession or depression. An independent nation generally offsets this with an easy monetary policy and devaluation of the currency, something that Greece cannot do as an EU member since they do not run their own monetary policy and share a common currency. Default would cause havoc in the EU banking system that holds most of Greece’s debt. An EU bailout would only push off the crisis since other weak members would demand the same deal. While the Greek economy is relatively small and the Portuguese economy slightly smaller, bailing out an economy the size of Spain’s would be an enormous or even impossible project. And leaving the EU would probably bring down the organization.

Furthermore Greece’s debt burden is only slightly more onerous than those of an alarming number of other nations including Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, Britain, Japan and, yes, even the U.S. Globally, assets soared in price during the boom, supported by vast increases in debt. Now the assets are severely diminished while the debts remain and there is insufficient income to pay them off.

The U.S. is far from immune. Administration budget projections of the deficit indicate that the gross Federal debt held by the public will exceed 100% of the GDP within two years while the deficit will amount to 10% of the GDP. The CBO estimates enormous deficits for the next ten years, and it doesn’t end there. And this is probably a best-case scenario that overestimates future economic growth, doesn’t include GSE debt and doesn’t account for the huge fiscal problems of the 50 states.

In addition the prospect of big deficits as far as the eye can see raises fears of default or currency depreciation leading to a rise in interest rates and a dampening of growth. So far interest rates have been held down by Fed purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), purchases by China and a rush to safety. However, Treasury Bond purchases amounting to $300 billion ended on October 31st while the program to buy $1.25 trillion of MBS comes to an end on March 31st. At the same time, China, while not actively selling U.S. Treasuries have sharply reduced their purchases and will probably continue doing so.

It therefore seems to us that investors are making a big mistake if they assume that Greece is too small and unimportant to matter and that the rest of the developed world is somehow isolated from the turmoil. Greece is to sovereign debt what subprime was to private debt. It’s the possible start of a vast tsunami that threatens to overwhelm the global economic and financial system. Investors should take heed.

Source: Comstock

The “PIGS” Problem

Surly Trader: "

If you are at all wondering why Europe and specifically the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, & Spain) have been in the macro spotlight as the next shoe to drop, it is very helpful to put a framework around the loss possibilities. In the credit markets there are two big issues when trouble arises: 1) How much exposure do you have and 2) How much will you recover if the credit defaults?

Let us frame the whole topic by reflecting on the risk flare that occurred with the default of Dubai. In the case of Dubai, the global exposure to Dubai was $60B. When looking at Greece, the European bank exposure to Greece is $253B. In particular, Germany and France have a combined exposure of $119B.

This might not seem like an astronomical number when reflecting on the hundreds of billions of dollars that the United States has used to bailout our financial system, but Greece is just a starting point. I have pointed it out time and again that if one country is allowed to fail in the Eurozone, then there will be a target painted on the others with weak balance sheets: Portugal, Italy, Spain and even Ireland.

So what does the entire exposure look like? It is not pretty. The exposure for Germany and France to the PIGS is $909B and the exposure for European Banks collectively is $2.1T with a ‘T’.

Spain creates a lot of yellow anxiety for Europe

The reality is that something must be done. I expect there will be a bailout package put in place and that the European Central Bank might get a new charter that is more akin to Uncle Sam’s. Can you hear the printing presses ramping up? The Euro will most likely feel downward pressure in months to come and the efficacy of the Eurozone will be left as a big question mark for a future debate."

A Greek crisis is coming to America

FT.com "

A Greek crisis is coming to America

By Niall Ferguson

Published: February 10 2010

It began in Athens. It is spreading to Lisbon and Madrid. But it would be a grave mistake to assume that the sovereign debt crisis that is unfolding will remain confined to the weaker eurozone economies. For this is more than just a Mediterranean problem with a farmyard acronym. It is a fiscal crisis of the western world. Its ramifications are far more profound than most investors currently appreciate.

There is of course a distinctive feature to the eurozone crisis. Because of the way the European Monetary Union was designed, there is in fact no mechanism for a bail-out of the Greek government by the European Union, other member states or the European Central Bank (articles 123 and 125 of the Lisbon treaty). True, Article 122 may be invoked by the European Council to assist a member state that is “seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control”, but at this point nobody wants to pretend that Greece’s yawning deficit was an act of God. Nor is there a way for Greece to devalue its currency, as it would have done in the pre-EMU days of the drachma. There is not even a mechanism for Greece to leave the eurozone.

That leaves just three possibilities: one of the most excruciating fiscal squeezes in modern European history – reducing the deficit from 13 per cent to 3 per cent of gross domestic product within just three years; outright default on all or part of the Greek government’s debt; or (most likely, as signalled by German officials on Wednesday) some kind of bail-out led by Berlin. Because none of these options is very appealing, and because any decision about Greece will have implications for Portugal, Spain and possibly others, it may take much horse-trading before one can be reached.

Yet the idiosyncrasies of the eurozone should not distract us from the general nature of the fiscal crisis that is now afflicting most western economies. Call it the fractal geometry of debt: the problem is essentially the same from Iceland to Ireland to Britain to the US. It just comes in widely differing sizes.

What we in the western world are about to learn is that there is no such thing as a Keynesian free lunch. Deficits did not “save” us half so much as monetary policy – zero interest rates plus quantitative easing – did. First, the impact of government spending (the hallowed “multiplier”) has been much less than the proponents of stimulus hoped. Second, there is a good deal of “leakage” from open economies in a globalised world. Last, crucially, explosions of public debt incur bills that fall due much sooner than we expect

For the world’s biggest economy, the US, the day of reckoning still seems reassuringly remote. The worse things get in the eurozone, the more the US dollar rallies as nervous investors park their cash in the “safe haven” of American government debt. This effect may persist for some months, just as the dollar and Treasuries rallied in the depths of the banking panic in late 2008.

Yet even a casual look at the fiscal position of the federal government (not to mention the states) makes a nonsense of the phrase “safe haven”. US government debt is a safe haven the way Pearl Harbor was a safe haven in 1941.

Even according to the White House’s new budget projections, the gross federal debt will exceed 100 per cent of GDP in just two years’ time. This year, like last year, the federal deficit will be around 10 per cent of GDP. The long-run projections of the Congressional Budget Office suggest that the US will never again run a balanced budget. That’s right, never.

The International Monetary Fund recently published estimates of the fiscal adjustments developed economies would need to make to restore fiscal stability over the decade ahead. Worst were Japan and the UK (a fiscal tightening of 13 per cent of GDP). Then came Ireland, Spain and Greece (9 per cent). And in sixth place? Step forward America, which would need to tighten fiscal policy by 8.8 per cent of GDP to satisfy the IMF.

Explosions of public debt hurt economies in the following way, as numerous empirical studies have shown. By raising fears of default and/or currency depreciation ahead of actual inflation, they push up real interest rates. Higher real rates, in turn, act as drag on growth, especially when the private sector is also heavily indebted – as is the case in most western economies, not least the US.

Although the US household savings rate has risen since the Great Recession began, it has not risen enough to absorb a trillion dollars of net Treasury issuance a year. Only two things have thus far stood between the US and higher bond yields: purchases of Treasuries (and mortgage-backed securities, which many sellers essentially swapped for Treasuries) by the Federal Reserve and reserve accumulation by the Chinese monetary authorities.

But now the Fed is phasing out such purchases and is expected to wind up quantitative easing. Meanwhile, the Chinese have sharply reduced their purchases of Treasuries from around 47 per cent of new issuance in 2006 to 20 per cent in 2008 to an estimated 5 per cent last year. Small wonder Morgan Stanley assumes that 10-year yields will rise from around 3.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent this year. On a gross federal debt fast approaching $15,000bn, that implies up to $300bn of extra interest payments – and you get up there pretty quickly with the average maturity of the debt now below 50 months.

The Obama administration’s new budget blithely assumes real GDP growth of 3.6 per cent over the next five years, with inflation averaging 1.4 per cent. But with rising real rates, growth might well be lower. Under those circumstances, interest payments could soar as a share of federal revenue – from a tenth to a fifth to a quarter.

Last week Moody’s Investors Service warned that the triple A credit rating of the US should not be taken for granted. That warning recalls Larry Summers’ killer question (posed before he returned to government): “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”

On reflection, it is appropriate that the fiscal crisis of the west has begun in Greece, the birthplace of western civilization. Soon it will cross the channel to Britain. But the key question is when that crisis will reach the last bastion of western power, on the other side of the Atlantic.

The writer is a contributing editor of the FT and author of ‘The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World‘

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How Often Should We Expect a Financial Crisis?

The Big Picture: "

In a recent WSJ OpEd, Elizabeth Warren chairman of the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, states “J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon recently explained this brave new world, saying that crises should be expected “every five to seven years.” He is wrong.”

I agree with the point that Dimon overstates the case — but Warren makes a market history error when claiming “laws that came out of the Great Depression ended 150 years of boom-and-bust cycles and gave us 50 years with virtually no financial meltdowns.”

I am a fan of Preofessor Warren’s, but she is factually incorrect when she claims “virtually no financial meltdowns” over that time period.

Market wise, as the 1968-82 period showed us, we had 5 major boom and bust cycles in the 1970s alone.

And as Jim Bianco points out, there is a long list of financial meltdowns from the 1970s forward:

• Franklin National Bank Failure on 1974
• Penn Square Failure of the early 1980s
• Gold bubble in 1980
• The Nifty Fifty stock market boom on the early 1970s
• The 1958 bond carry trade
• The Steel Tariffs of 1962
• The Stock Market Crash of 1987
• The S&L crisis of the 1980s
• The RTC
• The bond carry trade of 1994
• Mexican Debt crisis of 1982
• Mexican Debt Crisis on 1994
• The Asian Financial Crisis on 1997
• LTCM of 1998
• The Tech Bubble on 2000
• The Credit Crisis of 2006

The history of the 20th century is a tale of many meltdowns. And as we have learned, they have grown increasingly more expensive and dangerous as we have become complacent. We are getting used to collapses, and each one makes us fear the nex a little less . . . Until the big one hit."