utorok 16. februára 2010
The Five Stages of Collapse by Dmitry Orlov
'Unofficial' note on Greece
Albert Edwards: At 500% Net Liabilities To GDP, It Is Too Late To Prevent The Collapse Of The G-7; Greece Is Irrelevant, We Are All Now Insolvent
For Greece, with on and off balance sheet liabilities at over 800%, it's game over. For the Eurozone, with the same ratio at about 500%, it is also game over. For the US, at 500%+, it is, you guessed it (sorry Joseph Stiglitz), game over, but since we have the printers, it will simply take a little longer. Following up on yesterday's popular post on prevailing delusions as captured by Albert Edwards' colleague Dylan Grice, we present Albert's latest outlook. Please don't read this if you want to keep believing there is any hope left for the (developed) world.
But first some aeral photography from Dylan Grice, indicating just how far the US government is willing to go to get the population stoked about owning fixed (shouldn't it be called broken really?) income. With British QE over, and the country still to implement the same criminal annuitizing of 401(k)s that Uncle Sam is contempltating in order to make 'Buy Bonds' a 'voluntary' option one can't really decline, maybe letters on modern architecture building blocks is all that would works. As Edwards says: 'I'm not sure leaving man-sized building blocks around the City of London is really going to make an awful lot of difference, but I suppose when your public sector deficit is around 13% of GDP, every little bit helps!'
So back to Greece, the Eurozone, and policy response in general, Edwards places the causes (and 'solutions') of the escalating problem precisely where it belongs: at the core of the Keynesian systemic outlook flaw.
A major divergence of views in the market at the moment concerns what governments should be doing with their outsized fiscal deficits. Economists seem to be polarised between those who think governments should be rapidly cutting fiscal deficits to avoid impending insolvency and/or a surge in bond yields, and those who believe this will be totally counterproductive and that deficits should stay very large. Behind this controversy probably lies the key to the economic outlook.
To Edwards, and to ever more hedge fund investors judging by the jump back in Greece Bund spreads which just broke the most recent technical resistance level of 300 bps, Greece is nothing more than Russia and LTCM (or Bear Stearns as the case may be).
The situation in Greece following hard on the heels of similar solvency issues in Dubai feels to me very much like the Russian default and LTCM blow-up in 1998. For the blow-ups that year were a direct follow-on from the Asian crisis a year earlier a different chapter in the same book. There will be more crises to follow Greece, both inside and outside of the eurozone.
The outcome of broken Keynesian policy (by definition) will be ugly, and will destroy the eurozone. We said it some time ago, and SocGen has now also confirmed this bearish perspective.
My own view of developments, for what it is worth, is that any 'help' given to Greece merely delays the inevitable break-up of the eurozone. But, for me, the problem is not the size of the government deficit and the solvency or otherwise of the governments in the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain - we deliberately exclude Italy).
The problem for the PIGS is that years of inappropriately low interest rates resulted in overheating and rapid inflation, even though interest rates might well have been appropriate for the eurozone as a whole. Rapid inflation has led to overvalued bilateral real exchange rates (they do still notionally exist) for the PIGS and in most cases yawning double-digit current account deficits. With most trade done with other eurozone countries, the root problem for the PIGS is lack of competitiveness within the eurozone – an inevitable consequence of the one size fits all interest rate policy. Even if the PIGS governments could slash their fiscal deficits, as Ireland is attempting, to maintain credibility with the markets in the short term, the lack of competitiveness within the eurozone needs years of relative (and probably given the outlook elsewhere, absolute) deflation. Hence the PIGS public sector deficit will inevitably remain large as a direct consequence of this weak growth outlook.
As noted earlier on Zero Hedge, in Europe the population is a little less brainwashed by the moronic happenings on prime time TV, so while in America the destruction of the economic system, as trillions are transferred to the kleptocracy which knows fully well the end game is nigh, results in some sighs of desperation at best, in Europe the outcome will be somewhat more violent.
In my opinion this will not be tolerated by the electorates in these countries. Unlike Japan or the US, Europe has an unfortunate tendency towards civil unrest when subjected to extreme economic pain. Consigning the PIGS to a prolonged period of deflation is most likely to impose too severe a test on these nations. And the political 'consensus' within the PIGS to remain in the eurozone could falter in the face of another of Europe's unfortunate tendencies -the emergence of small extreme parties to take advantage of any unrest. My own view is that there is little 'help' that can be offered by the other eurozone nations other than temporary confidence-giving 'sticking plasters' before the ultimate denouement: the break-up of the eurozone.
And in case you were wondering why all European leaders are powerless to provide a bailout proposal that actually has a snowball's chance in hell of doing something/anything to help Greece, read on. Alternatively, if you want to find out why any plan suggested on Monday will be thoroughly useless and once digested by the market will cause another major crash, read on as well.
The pressure to tighten fiscal policy from current nose-bleed levels of deficits is not just an issue for crisis hit Greece. It is an issue for virtually all economies. It is a particular issue for the US and UK with structural (cyclically adjusted) general government deficits of almost 10% of GDP (according to the OECD)! There is a ferocious debate ongoing between those who believe there needs to be a rapid reduction in these deficits to avoid some combination of insolvency/default/rapid inflation and those who believe that there should be even more fiscal stimulus. The debate is loud and opinions are tending to be polarised.
My own view on this is that obviously we should never have got into this wholly avoidable mess in the first place. But having got here, there really is no way out that does not trigger a major market-moving upheaval. Ultimately economic prosperity over the past decade has been a sham: a totally unsustainable Ponzi scheme built on a mountain of private sector debt.GDP has simply been brought forward from the future and now it's payback time. The trouble is that, as the private sector debt unwinds, there is no political appetite to allow GDP to decline to its 'correct' level as this would involve a depression. So burgeoning public sector deficits and Quantitative Easing are required to maintain the fig-leaf of continued prosperity.
And here is the topic that will dominate over all pundit round table discussions in the next weeks: the entire world is insolvent, although some are more insolvent than others. Greek total net liabilities (on and off balance sheet) to GDP are 800%! EU: at 470%, the US, at over 500%. There is no way out but default.
Edwards' poignant summation.
I am persuaded by my colleague Dylan Grice's analysis that, including unfunded liabilities, most governments are already insolvent with debt to GDP ratios closer to 500% of GDP instead of around 100% for most G7 countries . It is too late.
Nor were Dylan and I persuaded by recent comments from Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz that it is absurd to suggest that the US and UK governments might default on their debts as they could just print money. Indeed. But a client pointed out to us that Weimar Germany did not default on its debts during its hyper-inflation. How reassuring!
I am persuaded though by Richard Koo's book about the lessons from Japan's balance sheet recession. The crux of his analysis is that governments have no option but to stimulate aggressively all the while the private sector is de-leveraging. ANY attempt at fiscal cuts simply results in renewed recession and a further loss of confidence, thus making it even harder and more costly to sustain any subsequent recovery - and hence the budget deficit ends up bigger than before (e.g. see chart below). This is exactly the outcome I expect.
The take home is very, very simple: we can delude ourselves that the game can be won (it can't), or we can prepare for the imminent collapse when delusion finally fails.
Greece is only a symptom
From Comstock Partners:
The Greek fiscal crisis is just a symptom of world-wide credit problems that was signaled by the emergence of subprime loan disclosures as early as August 2006. The importance of subprime lending was not recognized until much later, but nevertheless evolved into a continuing series of economic and financial crises that continue until this day. The problem has now extended to sovereign debt, and, as usual, the weakest links are exposed first (Dubai and Greece) only to spread to stronger entities later. Not far behind are Portugal and Spain, then perhaps Italy and Britain. It’s not just a localized minor problem to be solved by some sleight-of-hand by the EU, but a debt crisis that could envelop the globe.
In addition to excessive fiscal deficits by some of its weaker members, the EU has some special problems for which there are no good options. The Greek government can either undertake severe fiscal austerity measures, default, be bailed out by the EU or leave the organization entirely. Each of these has unwanted consequences. The result of enough fiscal austerity to relieve the debt pressures is a severe recession or depression. An independent nation generally offsets this with an easy monetary policy and devaluation of the currency, something that Greece cannot do as an EU member since they do not run their own monetary policy and share a common currency. Default would cause havoc in the EU banking system that holds most of Greece’s debt. An EU bailout would only push off the crisis since other weak members would demand the same deal. While the Greek economy is relatively small and the Portuguese economy slightly smaller, bailing out an economy the size of Spain’s would be an enormous or even impossible project. And leaving the EU would probably bring down the organization.
Furthermore Greece’s debt burden is only slightly more onerous than those of an alarming number of other nations including Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, Britain, Japan and, yes, even the U.S. Globally, assets soared in price during the boom, supported by vast increases in debt. Now the assets are severely diminished while the debts remain and there is insufficient income to pay them off.
The U.S. is far from immune. Administration budget projections of the deficit indicate that the gross Federal debt held by the public will exceed 100% of the GDP within two years while the deficit will amount to 10% of the GDP. The CBO estimates enormous deficits for the next ten years, and it doesn’t end there. And this is probably a best-case scenario that overestimates future economic growth, doesn’t include GSE debt and doesn’t account for the huge fiscal problems of the 50 states.
In addition the prospect of big deficits as far as the eye can see raises fears of default or currency depreciation leading to a rise in interest rates and a dampening of growth. So far interest rates have been held down by Fed purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), purchases by China and a rush to safety. However, Treasury Bond purchases amounting to $300 billion ended on October 31st while the program to buy $1.25 trillion of MBS comes to an end on March 31st. At the same time, China, while not actively selling U.S. Treasuries have sharply reduced their purchases and will probably continue doing so.
It therefore seems to us that investors are making a big mistake if they assume that Greece is too small and unimportant to matter and that the rest of the developed world is somehow isolated from the turmoil. Greece is to sovereign debt what subprime was to private debt. It’s the possible start of a vast tsunami that threatens to overwhelm the global economic and financial system. Investors should take heed.
Source: Comstock
The “PIGS” Problem
Let us frame the whole topic by reflecting on the risk flare that occurred with the default of Dubai. In the case of Dubai, the global exposure to Dubai was $60B. When looking at Greece, the European bank exposure to Greece is $253B. In particular, Germany and France have a combined exposure of $119B.
This might not seem like an astronomical number when reflecting on the hundreds of billions of dollars that the United States has used to bailout our financial system, but Greece is just a starting point. I have pointed it out time and again that if one country is allowed to fail in the Eurozone, then there will be a target painted on the others with weak balance sheets: Portugal, Italy, Spain and even Ireland.
So what does the entire exposure look like? It is not pretty. The exposure for Germany and France to the PIGS is $909B and the exposure for European Banks collectively is $2.1T with a ‘T’.
The reality is that something must be done. I expect there will be a bailout package put in place and that the European Central Bank might get a new charter that is more akin to Uncle Sam’s. Can you hear the printing presses ramping up? The Euro will most likely feel downward pressure in months to come and the efficacy of the Eurozone will be left as a big question mark for a future debate."
A Greek crisis is coming to America
A Greek crisis is coming to America
By Niall Ferguson
Published: February 10 2010
It began in Athens. It is spreading to Lisbon and Madrid. But it would be a grave mistake to assume that the sovereign debt crisis that is unfolding will remain confined to the weaker eurozone economies. For this is more than just a Mediterranean problem with a farmyard acronym. It is a fiscal crisis of the western world. Its ramifications are far more profound than most investors currently appreciate.
There is of course a distinctive feature to the eurozone crisis. Because of the way the European Monetary Union was designed, there is in fact no mechanism for a bail-out of the Greek government by the European Union, other member states or the European Central Bank (articles 123 and 125 of the Lisbon treaty). True, Article 122 may be invoked by the European Council to assist a member state that is “seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control”, but at this point nobody wants to pretend that Greece’s yawning deficit was an act of God. Nor is there a way for Greece to devalue its currency, as it would have done in the pre-EMU days of the drachma. There is not even a mechanism for Greece to leave the eurozone.
That leaves just three possibilities: one of the most excruciating fiscal squeezes in modern European history – reducing the deficit from 13 per cent to 3 per cent of gross domestic product within just three years; outright default on all or part of the Greek government’s debt; or (most likely, as signalled by German officials on Wednesday) some kind of bail-out led by Berlin. Because none of these options is very appealing, and because any decision about Greece will have implications for Portugal, Spain and possibly others, it may take much horse-trading before one can be reached.
Yet the idiosyncrasies of the eurozone should not distract us from the general nature of the fiscal crisis that is now afflicting most western economies. Call it the fractal geometry of debt: the problem is essentially the same from Iceland to Ireland to Britain to the US. It just comes in widely differing sizes.
What we in the western world are about to learn is that there is no such thing as a Keynesian free lunch. Deficits did not “save” us half so much as monetary policy – zero interest rates plus quantitative easing – did. First, the impact of government spending (the hallowed “multiplier”) has been much less than the proponents of stimulus hoped. Second, there is a good deal of “leakage” from open economies in a globalised world. Last, crucially, explosions of public debt incur bills that fall due much sooner than we expect
For the world’s biggest economy, the US, the day of reckoning still seems reassuringly remote. The worse things get in the eurozone, the more the US dollar rallies as nervous investors park their cash in the “safe haven” of American government debt. This effect may persist for some months, just as the dollar and Treasuries rallied in the depths of the banking panic in late 2008.
Yet even a casual look at the fiscal position of the federal government (not to mention the states) makes a nonsense of the phrase “safe haven”. US government debt is a safe haven the way Pearl Harbor was a safe haven in 1941.
Even according to the White House’s new budget projections, the gross federal debt will exceed 100 per cent of GDP in just two years’ time. This year, like last year, the federal deficit will be around 10 per cent of GDP. The long-run projections of the Congressional Budget Office suggest that the US will never again run a balanced budget. That’s right, never.
The International Monetary Fund recently published estimates of the fiscal adjustments developed economies would need to make to restore fiscal stability over the decade ahead. Worst were Japan and the UK (a fiscal tightening of 13 per cent of GDP). Then came Ireland, Spain and Greece (9 per cent). And in sixth place? Step forward America, which would need to tighten fiscal policy by 8.8 per cent of GDP to satisfy the IMF.
Explosions of public debt hurt economies in the following way, as numerous empirical studies have shown. By raising fears of default and/or currency depreciation ahead of actual inflation, they push up real interest rates. Higher real rates, in turn, act as drag on growth, especially when the private sector is also heavily indebted – as is the case in most western economies, not least the US.
Although the US household savings rate has risen since the Great Recession began, it has not risen enough to absorb a trillion dollars of net Treasury issuance a year. Only two things have thus far stood between the US and higher bond yields: purchases of Treasuries (and mortgage-backed securities, which many sellers essentially swapped for Treasuries) by the Federal Reserve and reserve accumulation by the Chinese monetary authorities.
But now the Fed is phasing out such purchases and is expected to wind up quantitative easing. Meanwhile, the Chinese have sharply reduced their purchases of Treasuries from around 47 per cent of new issuance in 2006 to 20 per cent in 2008 to an estimated 5 per cent last year. Small wonder Morgan Stanley assumes that 10-year yields will rise from around 3.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent this year. On a gross federal debt fast approaching $15,000bn, that implies up to $300bn of extra interest payments – and you get up there pretty quickly with the average maturity of the debt now below 50 months.
The Obama administration’s new budget blithely assumes real GDP growth of 3.6 per cent over the next five years, with inflation averaging 1.4 per cent. But with rising real rates, growth might well be lower. Under those circumstances, interest payments could soar as a share of federal revenue – from a tenth to a fifth to a quarter.
Last week Moody’s Investors Service warned that the triple A credit rating of the US should not be taken for granted. That warning recalls Larry Summers’ killer question (posed before he returned to government): “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?”
On reflection, it is appropriate that the fiscal crisis of the west has begun in Greece, the birthplace of western civilization. Soon it will cross the channel to Britain. But the key question is when that crisis will reach the last bastion of western power, on the other side of the Atlantic.
The writer is a contributing editor of the FT and author of ‘The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World‘
How Often Should We Expect a Financial Crisis?
In a recent WSJ OpEd, Elizabeth Warren chairman of the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, states “J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon recently explained this brave new world, saying that crises should be expected “every five to seven years.” He is wrong.”
I agree with the point that Dimon overstates the case — but Warren makes a market history error when claiming “laws that came out of the Great Depression ended 150 years of boom-and-bust cycles and gave us 50 years with virtually no financial meltdowns.”
I am a fan of Preofessor Warren’s, but she is factually incorrect when she claims “virtually no financial meltdowns” over that time period.
Market wise, as the 1968-82 period showed us, we had 5 major boom and bust cycles in the 1970s alone.
And as Jim Bianco points out, there is a long list of financial meltdowns from the 1970s forward:
• Franklin National Bank Failure on 1974
• Penn Square Failure of the early 1980s
• Gold bubble in 1980
• The Nifty Fifty stock market boom on the early 1970s
• The 1958 bond carry trade
• The Steel Tariffs of 1962
• The Stock Market Crash of 1987
• The S&L crisis of the 1980s
• The RTC
• The bond carry trade of 1994
• Mexican Debt crisis of 1982
• Mexican Debt Crisis on 1994
• The Asian Financial Crisis on 1997
• LTCM of 1998
• The Tech Bubble on 2000
• The Credit Crisis of 2006
The history of the 20th century is a tale of many meltdowns. And as we have learned, they have grown increasingly more expensive and dangerous as we have become complacent. We are getting used to collapses, and each one makes us fear the nex a little less . . . Until the big one hit."
